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The rise of anti-dumping, Effects on business
Natalie McNelis
Abstract
While conventional wisdom is that dumping is selling at a loss, this is not neces-
sarily the case. Dumping is exporting a product at a lower price than that charged
on the home market (the dumping margin (see Glossary)). As a result, a company
may be making money on the export of a product, but if it is making a greater profit
on its home market than it is making on a foreign market, it may be dumping. A
company may engage in dumping as part of a deliberate strategy (for instance, it
may be protected from competition on its home market and may use this advan-
tage to push competitors out of other markets). Alternatively, price differences
between domestic and imported products may be explained by different demand
curves or other normal business behaviour. Either way, dumping can affect com-
petition in markets that import these lower priced products, and has the potential
to eliminate local competitors.
While conventional wisdom is that
dumping is selling at a loss, this is not
necessarily the case. Dumping is ex-
porting a product at a lower price than
that charged on the home market (the
dumping margin (see Glossary)). As a
result, a company may be making
money on the export of a product, but
if it is making a greater profit on its
home market than it is making on a
foreign market, it may be dumping.  
A company may engage in dumping as
part of a deliberate strategy (for in-
stance, it may be protected from com-
petition on its home market and may
use this advantage to push competitors
out of other markets). Alternatively,
price differences between domestic
and imported products may be ex-
plained by different demand curves or
other normal business behaviour. Ei-
ther way, dumping can affect competi-
tion in markets that import these lower
priced products, and has the potential
to eliminate local competitors.  
Anti-dumping law, together with anti-
subsidy law and safeguards, have de-
veloped at the World Trade Organisa-
tion (WTO) level to defend domestic
industries against some of the competi-
tion issues that have arisen as a result of
trade liberalisation, such as dumping.
It is a complex area of law, but one that
is increasingly affecting companies, ei-
ther whether they are asking their
country for protection (complainants)
or are the “targets” of an anti-dumping
action brought by a country to which
they export (exporters), or whether
they are just caught in the cross-fire
(importers and users).
Against this backdrop, this article:
• Explains when countries can im-
pose anti-dumping measures.
• Sets out the procedure for conduct-
ing an anti-dumping investigation in
the EU (see box, Anti-dumping inves-
tigations in the EU).
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• Provides an overview of the dis-
pute settlement mechanisms available
in the EU and WTO once an anti-
dumping decision has been made.
• Considers the effects of anti-dump-
ing on business and provides some
guidance on how to bring or defend
an anti-dumping action.
Imposing anti-dumping 
measures
Article VI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994
and the WTO Agreement on Imple-
mentation of Article VI of GATT
1947 (the Anti-dumping Agreement)
allow member countries of the
WTO to take anti-dumping action
to assist their domestic industries in
certain circumstances. If countries,
after rigorous investigation, find
that injurious dumping is taking
place, they can impose measures on
offenders. 
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Anti-dumping 
measures are being
used increasingly
around the world to
combat the flood of
cheaper imports on to
domestic markets.
Natalie McNelis
explains how 
anti-dumping law
works and considers 
its impact on business. 
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Injurious dumping is that which causes
material harm to the relevant domestic
industry in the target country. To de-
termine whether the domestic industry
has sustained material injury, the in-
vestigating authority looks at:
• The volume of the dumped imports.
• The effect of the dumped imports
on prices in the target market for the
same or similar (“like”) products.
• The impact of the dumped imports
on the domestic industry.  
Before a country can impose anti-
dumping measures on an exporter
dumping a product on its domestic
market, it must be able to demon-
strate that this dumping is causing
material injury independently of any
other factors that may also be damag-
ing the domestic industry. Examples
of such other factors include:
• The volume and prices of non-
dumped imports. 
• Imports from other countries
(which may be dumped).
• Contraction in demand or changes
in the patterns of consumption. 
• Restrictive trade practices of, and
competition between, third country
and domestic producers.
In the EU, an anti-dumping investiga-
tion is carried out by the European
Commission (specifically, the Direc-
torate-General Trade), which investi-
gates both dumping and injury (see
box, Anti-dumping investigations in
the EU). The Commission then sub-
mits a proposal to the Council of the
European Union (the Council) rec-
ommending either the imposition or
non-imposition of anti-dumping
measures (only the Council has the
power to impose final measures). 
In the US, the Department of Com-
merce investigates dumping, while
the International Trade Commission
(ITC) investigates injury and causa-
tion. If injurious dumping is found,
the Department of Commerce in-
structs US customs to commence ap-
plying duties.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ANTI-DUMPING LAW
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The complaint. The domestic industry approaches the European Commission to 
complain about dumping. Usually the "complaint" is not really complete; it is 
unsubstantiated and needs work before the Commission can consider it. The 
Commission usually asks the industry to present a more detailed case. 
The initiation (45 days later (Day 1)).  When the complaint is ready, the industry 
formally submits it, and the Commission has 45 days to decide whether to begin an 
investigation. If it decides to do so, it publishes a notice in the C-series of the 
Official Journal. It obtains a list of companies concerned and trade associations from 
the complainants, and notifies them of the procedure. The Commission also notifies 
the country concerned, and that country notifies interested parties (although some 
companies may not hear about the investigation until it is too late).  
The questionnaires (due around one month from Day 1). Exporters and related 
importers have about one month to fill in a lengthy, complex questionnaire. Extensions 
are routinely granted, but usually only for an extra week or two. The questionnaire is 
designed to provide the information the investigators need to establish a normal value 
(see Glossary) so the questionnaire will ask for detailed information about the 
company's domestic sales over the period of investigation (usually one year). The 
questionnaire will also be detailed when it comes to export price. It will ask for 
information about the sales to the importing market, generally a transaction-by-
transaction account of every sale to the target market that took place during the year-
long investigation period. This may comprise tens of thousands of transactions, which 
the investigating authority will expect to receive itemised in electronic format.
Domestic producers must also fill out questionnaires at this stage, mainly to 
determine the existence and gravity of the injury. These questionnaires focus on the 
health of their businesses over the past few years, and the factors that are affecting it.
Deficiency letters (around two months from Day 1). Once the questionnaire responses 
are in, the Commission looks at them to determine whether any information is missing. 
It then sends out "deficiency letters" requesting any additional information required.
Verification (two to four months from Day 1). Investigators visit the home offices of 
companies that have filled out questionnaires (both domestic producers and exporters) 
to check that information provided is true and accurate.  A verification visit generally 
lasts a couple of days. 
First hearing (after verification, around four months from Day 1). Interested parties 
may come to the Commission to present their views orally, with the aim of influencing 
the Commission's provisional decision.
Anti-dumping investigations in the EU 
While every case is slightly different, the following events occur in a 
typical anti-dumping procedure in the EU:
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A country taking action against
dumping generally imposes duties
(additional to those negotiated and
fixed during a WTO “round”) at the
border to either bring the price of the
product:
• Up to “non-dumped” level.
• To such a level that the imports
will not cause injury to the domestic
industry anymore, if that is less (the
approach taken by the EU but not by
all WTO members). 
Anti-dumping duties are imposed at
the border by customs officials and
are usually ad valorem (a percentage
of the value declared at customs).    
Under anti-dumping law, countries
can accept price undertakings from
exporters (a commitment from the
exporter to charge at least a certain
price for the product). In the EU, if
extra duties are about to be im-
posed, exporters can contact the
Commission to work out such an
undertaking. If an undertaking is
agreed, the duty does not apply to
that company. Price undertakings
are viewed as fairer as the dumping
problem is resolved for the domestic
industry, but the exporter gets to
keep the extra money charged,
rather than paying it to the customs
authorities. Exporters must respect
their undertakings, or else risk los-
ing them and bearing the extra duty
instead.
The WTO allows countries to have
either a prospective or a retrospective
system of anti-dumping:
• In a prospective system (such as the
EU), the amount of the dumping and
injury is calculated on the basis of a
past period of time (usually the year
before the investigation was initiated)
and duties are put in place for the fu-
ture. 
• In a retrospective system (such as
the US), the country imposing the
measure estimates the amount of
dumping on the basis of a past pe-
riod, but each year conducts an ad-
ministrative review to calculate the
actual amount of dumping that took
place.  
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: ANTI-DUMPING LAW
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Provisional measures (maximum nine months from Day 1). The Commission may 
impose provisional anti-dumping measures if it finds that: 
■ There is dumping and injury. 
■ The dumping caused that injury. 
■ Imposing measures is not against the Community interest. It might not be in the  
 Community interest to impose duties if, for example, there is a more important  
 domestic industry that depends on the supply of the dumped product for making  
 a downstream product. 
Provisional measures have a life of six months. During this time they must be 
confirmed by definitive measures (see below). If this is not done, the measures lapse 
and any duties provisionally collected must be returned (although importers usually 
provide a bank guarantee rather than pay provisional duties). 
Comments on provisional measures (maximum of ten months from Day 1). In addition 
to provisional measures, interested parties will have received a "provisional disclosure 
letter" which explains the Commission's conclusions in more detail.  They have up to 
one month in which to comment on this.
Second hearing (ten to 14 months from Day 1). The second hearing is another 
opportunity for interested parties to come to the Commission and express their views 
orally to the investigators.  
Proposal for definitive measures (usually 14 months from Day 1, although this can be 
shorter if provisional measures are adopted in less than nine months). As provisional 
measures are only valid for six months, one month before they are due to expire the 
Commission submits a proposal for definitive measures to the Council.  
Definitive measures (no more than 15 months from Day 1). At the end of its 
investigation, regardless of whether it has imposed provisional duties, the Commission 
may propose that the Council of the European Union (the Council) impose definitive 
anti-dumping duties if this is not against the Community interest. The Council makes 
its decision by simple majority, and any measures imposed last for five years.  
Reviews (in the years after imposition of definitive duties). The Commission can 
undertake an interim review while definitive measures are in place in light of 
"changed circumstances", if at least one year has passed since their imposition. An 
interim review may result in either: 
■ The imposition of a higher or lower duty. 
■ No change in the duty imposed. 
■ Termination of the duty imposed.  
At the end of five years, the domestic industry can request that the Commission 
conduct an expiry review (called a "sunset review" in the US).  This may result in 
measures being maintained or removed (they cannot be modified). Measures can be 
renewed by the Council for another five years if the Commission determines that 
removing them would result in a recurrence of dumping and injury.
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In any event, countries imposing anti-
dumping duties can only compensate
for the amount of dumping found, so
there must be a procedure for refund
if a company has overpaid.  
Dispute settlement mechanisms
An affected exporter or the domestic
industry may object to an anti-dump-
ing decision made by a country.
While the exporter may object if ex-
tra duties are imposed, the domestic
industry may object if such duties are
not imposed. In the EU, a com-
plainant can bring an action in the
Court of First Instance of the Euro-
pean Communities (CFI), with ap-
peals going to the European Court of
Justice (ECJ).  
There is also a WTO dispute settle-
ment procedure, which can only be
used by countries rather than private
parties. However, a country will of-
ten act at the request of a domestic in-
dustry that objects to another coun-
try’s anti-dumping procedure.
Judicial review in the EU
To bring a case before the CFI, a com-
plainant must have standing, that is,
it must be “directly or individually
concerned”. While an affected do-
mestic producer or foreign exporter
normally has standing, an importer
usually does not. 
It is difficult to obtain a reversal of a
decision by the Commission or Coun-
cil in the CFI.  The Commission and
Council have considerable discretion
in matters involving complex eco-
nomic facts, and the CFI is unlikely to
second-guess their findings. The CFI
will not hesitate to intervene, how-
ever, if a procedural flaw has oc-
curred in the investigation (that is, it
was not fair and thorough). 
While the European courts are reluc-
tant to overrule a decision in favour
of, or against, the imposition of anti-
dumping duties, the ECJ recently
held that where a decision to decline
the imposition of duties is made, the
Community body that made the deci-
sion must “provide an adequate state-
ment of reasons which shows clearly
and unambiguously why, in the light
of the provisions of the basic regula-
tion, there is no need to adopt the
proposal” (judgment of the ECJ of 30
September 2003 in Case C-76/01 P,
Eurocoton v. Council (not yet re-
ported), at recitals 89 – 94).
WTO dispute settlement
It is comparatively easier to obtain the
reversal of an anti-dumping decision at
the WTO than before the European
courts. Cases are heard by WTO dis-
Dumping margin. The difference between the normal value and the export
price, usually expressed as a percentage of the export price. If dumping is tak-
ing place, the normal value will be higher than the export price (a positive
dumping margin).
Export price. Actual invoiced prices for export sales to the target market during
the anti-dumping investigation period (usually one year). The export price
must be comparable to the normal value, that is, if the normal value is stated as
the price at the “factory gate”, the export price must also be stated as at the fac-
tory gate (subtracting costs such as transport and insurance). 
The invoiced export price must also be at “arm’s length”. If, for instance, the
exporter sells a product through a related company, the investigating authority
may consider that the inter-company invoice price is not at arm’s length, and
will probably construct the export price. This is achieved by taking the first sale
to an independent customer and deducting from it all costs accrued beyond the
factory gate. Exporters usually dislike a constructed export price, arguing that
the investigating authority deducts too many costs (resulting in an artificially
deflated export price).   
Non-market economy treatment. Investigating authorities have traditionally
disregarded normal value prices and cost figures that come from an economy
they consider to be controlled by the state, such as the People’s Republic of
China (the PRC), because they are believed to be inherently unreliable. Instead,
investigators tend to calculate normal values on the figures of companies in a
different market (called an analogue country in the EU or a surrogate market in
the US). As an example, the EU recently opened an investigation against the
PRC and suggested Norway as the analogue market for the purposes of estab-
lishing normal value (Notice of Initiation of an anti-dumping proceeding con-
cerning imports of certain castings originating in the People’s Republic of
China, OJEC [2004] C104, p. 62).
Normal value. The price of the exported product on the home market, based on
actual invoices for home sales during the anti-dumping investigation period
(usually one year).
Investigating authorities may construct normal value in certain circumstances
(for instance, if domestic sales were loss making, or if domestic sales account
for less than 5% of export sales). Normal value is constructed by calculating
the cost of production plus selling, general and administrative expenses
(SG&A) and a “reasonable” profit margin. Exporters usually dislike a con-
structed normal value because they argue that it is artificially inflated by unrea-
sonably estimated costs and SG&A and an optimistic profit margin.  
Zeroing. A procedure used by an investigating authority when calculating a
company’s dumping margin. Under this procedure, the authority takes into
consideration only the dumped transactions a company has engaged in when
calculating the dumping margin (non-dumped transactions are counted as
zero). By doing this, the company does not “get credit” for transactions where
it has not dumped.
Glossary 
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pute settlement panels, with appeal to
the WTO Appellate Body.  To date,
dozens of decisions on anti-dumping
measures (and some general method-
ological practices) have been chal-
lenged in the WTO. Of these, nearly
all have been “lost” to some extent by
the country that imposed the measure.  
While the majority of anti-dumping
cases brought before the WTO are in-
tensely fact-based and therefore have
little impact on other cases, two in
particular have had broader ranging
effects: 
• Bed Linen (European Communi-
ties – Anti-Dumping Duties on Im-
ports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen
From India, Appellate Body Report
WT/DS141/AB/R, adopted on 12
March 2001). In this case, the WTO
Appellate Body held that the EU was
wrong to have used a method (zero-
ing) to calculate the dumping mar-
gins, as this practice was not allowed
by the Anti-dumping Agreement. The
EU ceased zeroing in all anti-dump-
ing cases and has now brought a case
against the US alleging that its zero-
ing is also WTO-illegal (request for
the establishment of a panel of 19
February 2004 in United States -
Laws, Regulations And Methodology
For Calculating Dumping Margins
(“Zeroing”), WT/DS294/7/Rev.1).
• Byrd Amendment (Appellate Body
Report on United States - Continued
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000, Appellate Body Report
WT/DS217/AB/R, T/DS234/AB/R,
adopted on 27 January 2003). At issue
in this case was a US law (the Byrd
Amendment, Distribution of Contin-
ued Dumping and Subsidy Offset to
Affected Domestic Producers, 66 Fed.
Reg. 48,546 (US Customs Service 21
Sept. 2001) (final rule) (19 CFR §§
159.61 – 159.64)) that allowed anti-
dumping duties, among other things,
to be distributed to “affected domes-
tic producers” (in this case, the com-
plainants and others who supported
the complaint). The countries that
brought the case against the US (Aus-
tralia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, the EU,
India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mex-
ico and Thailand) argued that this
gave domestic industries in the US an
additional incentive to petition for
anti-dumping action. The domestic
industry was in effect given a double
benefit as competing exporters were
handicapped by an extra cost, and the
domestic industry was advantaged by
the payment.
The WTO Appellate Body struck
down the Byrd Amendment. It held
that WTO member countries can im-
pose provisional and definitive duties
and agree price undertakings – they
have no further powers. The US has
not yet repealed the Byrd Amend-
ment and on 31 August 2004, the
WTO arbitrator authorised the plan-
tiffs to retaliate. 
Effects on business
The effects of dumping and anti-
dumping on business differ depend-
ing on whether the business con-
cerned is an exporter, domestic
competitor or importer.
Exporters
Anti-dumping action can have several
negative effects on exporters. An
anti-dumping investigation is rigor-
ous and time-consuming (usually
lasting about a year and a half).  Even
if no dumping is ultimately found, the
opening of an investigation can mean
the loss of customers who are often
unwilling to take the risk that their
supplier will have additional duty im-
posed on it when the investigation is
completed, even if reassured that no
dumping is taking place (see below
Importers).  Under anti-absorption
rules in place (in the EU, Article 12,
Council Regulation 384/96/EC (OJ
1996 L56/1) as modified by Council
Regulation 461/2004/EC (OJ 2004
L77/12)), an exporter cannot pay such
duty on behalf of the customer, either
directly or indirectly. 
Knowing how difficult and damaging
the mere opening of an anti-dumping
investigation can be, exporters can
make some effort to avoid it, for ex-
ample, by not dramatically flooding a
foreign market with their products or
by focusing on developing or export-
ing products that will not compete di-
rectly with local products.
If an anti-dumping investigation is
opened, it is in the exporter’s interest
to participate at each stage and re-
spond promptly to requests for infor-
mation. This allows the exporter to
argue its case against the imposition
of anti-dumping measures. If an ex-
porter decides not to co-operate, the
investigating authority is free to use
the “best information available”
(facts available). This is usually the
worst information available, since an
investigating authority does not want
to “reward” exporters for non-co-op-
eration.  This means that exporters
who do not participate in the investi-
gation inevitably receive worse treat-
ment than those that do. If measures
appear unavoidable, an exporter
should consider offering a price un-
dertaking.  
While exporters often argue that anti-
dumping action is a form of protec-
tionism because of in-built biases in-
volved in calculating constructed
normal values and export prices, as
well as the concept of non-market
economy treatment, it is a reality, and
it is therefore advisable that exporters
be aware of, and prepare for, the pos-
sible consequences of dumping.
Domestic competitors
For the domestic industry, dumping
can mean its extinction. It may have in-
built competitive disadvantages, such
as higher labour costs and environ-
mental standards, which mean that it
cannot compete with products coming
from other countries. Despite this,
anti-dumping action is usually taken
as a last resort, as the process of lodg-
ing a complaint and the subsequent in-
vestigation are time consuming.  
Before a complaint is lodged, a com-
pany should first try to assess
whether the imports in question are
being dumped. It should also attempt
to determine whether the domestic
industry in general is suffering a de-
cline in production, prices and prof-
itability.  
If a company decides to go ahead with
a complaint, it should then make con-
tact with other companies similarly af-
fected by dumping, as the relevant au-
thority will only begin an investigation
if a “major proportion” of the domes-
tic industry supports it, or at least does
not oppose it. However, as competi-
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tion concerns can arise if a company
approaches another company about
prices, it is usually advisable to make
contact through an independent third
party such as a trade association or law
firm, which can collect confidential in-
formation and consolidate it to draw
up a complaint.
If a complaint, which takes some
time to prepare, can make an initial
case for dumping, injury and causa-
tion, then the investigating authority
normally must open an investiga-
tion. The domestic industry must
then fill out questionnaires to prove
the existence of injury (see box,
Anti-dumping investigations in the
EU). Complainants must also be on-
call to answer any questions raised
by the investigating authority in re-
lation to the complaint throughout
the investigation.  
Importers
In the short term at least, importers
(and consumers) are likely to be nega-
tively affected by anti-dumping action,
which raises prices on the domestic
market. In the long term, anti-dump-
ing is designed to protect consumers
from a potential export strategy where
a low price is charged until competi-
tors are eliminated from the market, at
which time prices increase.
When an anti-dumping investigation
is begun, an importer is likely to seek
alternative sources of supply, al-
though this in itself can be a costly
and time-consuming exercise. Im-
porters are consulted by the Commis-
sion during an investigation and can
complete an importers questionnaire,
to help the Commission assess the
harm eventual measures would do to
the Community interest.
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